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NOTES

fits of the legislation so evident that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
bill, leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of constitutionality. A decision by the Supreme Court relative to this measure would be
helpful as indicating, with increasing clarity, the constitutional limits within which
this government must operate.71
Conclusion
The purpose of education in a democratic society is to prepare the child for
responsible citizenship. In the words of the New York Commissioner's Advisory
Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions, "The presence in a
single school of children from vaned racial, cultural, socio-economic, and religious backgrounds is an important element in the preparation of young people
for active participation in the social and political affairs of our democracy." 72
The neighborhood school is a result of a long-established and basically
sound educational policy. But its concept is not sacrosanct, and there is no reason
why it should not be subject to reevaluation and revision n light of current
social conditions. In the reapportionment cases the citizen is deprived of his
right to equal representation n the casting of his ballot. In the school cases, the
child of the racial minority is not only deprived of his right to equal educational
opportunity, but he has the added burden of being forced to attend school under
these unequal conditions until he reaches a specified age.73 It would seem, then,
that legislatures and courts should utilize whatever analogies may be helpful
n solving the de facto problem, especially in view of what s at stake-the adequate education of a substantial number of citizens.
Ronald G. Harmngton*
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297, 298 (ed.

Roseman 1938). The Bituminous Coal Act was declared unconstitutional in Carter v.

Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
72 Statement proposed by the State Education Commissioner's Advisory Committee,
supra n.60 at 740.
73
In Branche v. Board of Edue., 204 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) the court
found that the requirement 6f school attendance was sufficient state action under the
Brown doctrine to require that the school district be rezoned.
* Member, Second Year Class.

INCOME TAXATION AND PREEMPTION
The power to tax is essential to effective government. Chartered cities in Califorma have long been held to have the power to tax for revenue purposes.' The
existence of this power, however, was drawn in question by the California Legislature in 1963, when it enacted a statute that purports to preempt the entire field of
income taxation.2 This statute expressly states that no city, including a chartered
I City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957); Ex parte Braun,
141 Cal. 204, 74 Pac. 780 (1903).
2 CAL. 1 Ev. & TAx. CODE § 17041.5, which provides in part: "Notwithstanding any
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city, shall have the power to impose a personal income tax.3 It is the purpose of
this note to examine the validity of this purported preemption and to present its
possible long-range effect on the general powers of chartered cities to tax for
revenue purposes.
Municipal Affairs
All cities are able to engage in some degree of self-regulation, but chartered
cities have a greater measure of autonomy than general-law cities. The Califorma
constitution specifically provides that chartered cities have the power to make and
enforce all laws regarding municipal affairs, subject only to whatever restrictions
are contained in their charters.4 In terms of the validity of an income tax levied
by a chartered city, the crucial question becomes whether or not a given area of
activity can be termed a municipal affair. If not, it is regulated by the general
State law, and if the State has preempted the area, no city, including a chartered
city, can subject it to municipal control.5 But if the area is held to be a municipal
affair, it is then exclusively within the control of the chartered city and the chartered city is exempt from all general State laws concerning that area of activity.6
Municipal affairs are beyond the reach of State legislative enactment as far as
chartered cities are concerned.7 If general law and local law are m conflict in this
area, local law controls.8
A chartered city may restrict its own right to control a particular municipal
affairs area. This can be done by placing terms of express curtailment of the city's
power in the charter itself. 9 Since the power of a chartered city to control its
municipal affairs flows from the California constitution,' 0 this power may also be
expressly curtailed in that mstrument. 11 Thus a provision in the constitution itself
may put a given topic within the control of the State, even though it would
normally be considered a municipal affair.12 The basic principle, then, of the
chartered city's autonomy is this: a chartered city has full control over its mumcipal affairs except as this control is clearly and explicitly curtailed by the California
constitution or the local charter itself.'$
statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or decision to the contrary, no city, county, city and
county, governmental subdivision, district, public and quasi-public corporation, mumcipal
corporation
whether chartered or not, shall levy or collect or cause to be levied or
collected any tax upon the income, or any part thereof, of any person, resident or
nonresident
s Ibzd.
4 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6. See also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(j).
5 Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 32 Cal.

Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158 (1963); Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957).
6 Cit of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P.2d 1 (1957); City of Pasadena
v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745 (1932).
7 Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 207, 74 Pac. 780, 781 (1903).
SHeilbron v. Sumner, 186 Cal. 648, 651, 200 Pac. 409, 410 (1921); Ex parte
Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 Pac. 780 (1903).
9 City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3 (1957); Muhleisen

v. Forward, 4 Cal. 2d 17, 46 P.2d 969 (1935).
10 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6. See also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(j).

11Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 211, 74 Pac. 780, 783 (1903).
12 In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 74, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74
108, 389 P.2d 538, 572 (1964).
3a Ibid., City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3 (1957).
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Revenue Taxation as a Municipal Affair
In light of the rule that a chartered city has control over its mumcpal affairs,
the next consideration is whether the term "municipal affairs" includes the power
to tax for revenue purposes. There is no precise definition of "municipal affairs."
14
The term is not a fixed concept; it changes as conditions change. The standard
label used by the courts is that the term "municipal affairs" refers to the "internal
business affairs of the municipality," 15 and nothing that is a matter of general
statewide concern can be a municipal affair.' 6 It can readily be seen that this
definition does not provide a very specific gmde for determining whether or not
a given topic is entitled to be classified as a municipal affair.
For the purposes of this note, however, it is sufficient to ascertain whether or
not the power of a chartered city to tax for revenue purposes17 is a municipal
affair. A chartered city's power of taxation, like all local powers, must have its
origin in a grant from the State and it may therefore at all times be controlled
by the State.' 8 But it does not follow that this local power of taxation can be
controlled by the legislative department of the State.' 9 If this local power ongi26
nated in a grant from the legislature it could be controlled by the legislature.
The power of chartered cities to tax for municipal revenue purposes, however,
does not find its source in any grant from the California Legislature. 21 This power
22
has been granted directly by the people of California in the State constitution
23
and therefore cannot be controlled by the legislature. The courts have firmly
placed a chartered city's power to tax for revenue purposes in this category of
constitutionally granted taxation power in numerous decisions holding that such
taxation power is strictly a municipal affair.2 4 Applying the principle previously
14 Courts often hold that changed conditions have turned what was once a municipal
affair into a matter of general statewide concern. Pacific TeL &Tel. Co. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959), held that changed conditions
had turned the construction and maintenance of telephone lines into a matter of general
statewide concern even with respect to lines on a particular city street. Helmer v.
Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 Pac. 1001 (1920), held that the regulation of
motor vehicle traffic had become a matter of general statewide concern and was no
longer a municipal affair even within a particular municipality.
15 City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804, 811, 306 P.2d 453, 456 (1957);
Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 58 Pac. 923 (1899). See generally Note, 16 HAsnNGs
L.J. 265 (1964) for a discussion of the nature of the municipal affairs concept.
10 City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745 (1932); Horwith v.
City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168 P.2d 767 (1946).
17 Taxes are imposed for one of two different purposes, or both. One purpose is to
raise revenue; the other is to regulate that which is taxed. It is beyond the scope of this
note to consider the problems that arise if a tax- is held to be regulatory instead of
mposed for revenue purposes; suffice it to say that a Pandora's box is opened concerning
intra-state preemption.
IsEx parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 211, 74 Pac. 780, 783 (1903). Braun is quoted and
followed on this point m West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco,
14 Cal. 2d 516, 524, 95 P.2d 138, 143 (1939).

19 Authorities cited note 18 supra.
20 Aljd

21 IlTjd,
22 1bid,
23 Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204,2 07, 74 Pac. 780, 781 (1903).
24
City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1957); Ains-
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stated, it follows that the power of a chartered city to tax for revenue purposes is
limited only by express provisions of curtailment found in the California constitu25
tion or the particular city charter.
It has been held that a tax on income is a tax for revenue purposes. 26 Since
revenue taxation is a municipal affar 2 7 and income taxation is revenue taxation,
it would seem logically to follow that income taxation is a municipal affair. As
indicated above, if income taxation by a chartered city is a municipal affair it
is not subject to general law and can be curtailed only by the California constitution or the local charter. This proposition, however, has not been accepted by
28
the legislature.

Income Taxes and Revenue Taxes
The California Legislature, in the face of the above decisions holding revenue
taxation to be a municipal affair, has enacted legislation that purports to preempt
the entire field of income taxation.29 As a result, one is led inescapably to one of
two possible conclusions: Either 1) the statute is not effective, at least insofar as
it purports to occupy completely the field of personal income taxation in California,
or 2) income taxation is not, or at least is no longer, a municipal affair. It appears
that the legislature may also have realized that there was some conflict in this
area. For example, the statute itself says that it is effective "notwithstanding
"0
any decisions to the contrary
Since the adoption of the statute the court has continued to indicate that city
revenue taxation is a municipal affair 3 ' and therefore beyond the reach of legislative enactment. Income taxation is revenue taxation. 2 On its face it would therefor appear that the statute is not effective in its attempt to occupy completely the
field of income taxation.
The conclusion that the statute is invalid, however, is not necessarily the
present state of the law. If income taxation were to be held not to be a municipal
affair the statute would, of course, be valid, since a topic that is not a municipal
worth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 211 P.2d 564, 566 (1949); West Coast Advertising
Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 524, 95 P.2d 138, 143 (1939);
In re Norwak, 184 Cal. 701, 704, 195 Pac. 402, 403 (1921); Ex parte Jackson, 143 Cal.
564, 572, 77 Pac. 457, 460 (1904); Ex parte Braun, supra note 23, at 213, 74 Pac. at
783-84.
25 City of Glendale v. Trondsen, supra note 24, at 98, 308 P.2d at 3; Ainsworth v.
Bryant, supra note 24, at 469, 211 P.2d at 566; West Coast Advertising Co. v. City &
County
of San Francisco, supra note 24, at 526, 95 P.2d at 144.
26
Sims v. Aherns, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W 720 (1925); Califorma Employment
Com'n v. Black-Foxe Military Institute, 43 Cal. App. 2d 868, 110 P.2d 729 (1941);
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947);
Alaska
v. Baker, 64 Wash. 2d 207, 390 P.2d 1009 (1964).
27
City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1957); Ainsworth2 8v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 211 P.2d 564, 566 (1949).
CAL. R-v.& TAx. CODE § 17041.5.
29 Ibid.

30
Ibid.
31

Inre Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 74, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74,
108, 389
P.2d 538, 572 (1964) (dictum).
32 Sims v. Aherns, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W 720 (1925); Californa Employment
Comm'n v. Black-Foxe Military Institute, 43 Cal. App. 2d 868, 110 P.2d 729 (1941).
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affair is subject to general law.3s As conditions throughout the State change, the
constitutional concept of municipal affairs also changes, 4 as has been indicated.
The term "municipal affairs" does not have a fixed or static definition. What at
one time was a municipal affair may later become a matter of general statewide concern and hence lose its municipal affairs status.3 5 Thus, if the question of the validity
of the statute were put squarely before the court, all the court would have to do
to sustam it is hold that city income taxation is, or through changed conditions
has become, a matter of general statewide concern.3 6 Such a holding would make
the legislative preemption of the field unquestionably valid. This appears to be
a likely result in view of analogous situations where the courts continually redefine
municipal affairs, particularly in the field of taxation and licensing.37 The question
of the validity of the income tax statute was not before the court in the case,
decided since the enactment of the statute, that indicated that revenue taxation is
still a municipal affair.3s Had this question been before the court there may have
been a different outcome.
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that the conclusion that city income
taxation is not a municipal affair is correct, where does this leave revenue taxation in general? If city income taxation is revenue taxation39 and if city income
taxation is not a municipal affair, can it logically be argued that city revenue taxation is a municipal affair? Aside from policy considerations to be discussed below,
it would seem that there is no logical basis for singling out income taxation and
holding it to be a matter of general statewide concern and at the same time holdmg other forms of revenue taxation to be municipal affairs. A tax levied on the
income a person receives by working within a community, and therefore usually
receives as a result of the community's economic activity, appears to be every bit
as much of an "internal business affair of the municipality" 40 as does any revenue
33

Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957); Eastlick v. City of Los
Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 177 P.2d 558 (1947).
34
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336
P.2d 514 (1959).
35 Ibtd.

30 See note 14 supra.
37

The power of chartered cities to license for purposes of revenue and regulation

has become less and less a municipal affair and more and more a matter of general state-

wide concern through a number of decisions in the past twenty years. See Agnew v. City
of Culver City, 51 Cal. 2d 474, 334 P.2d 571 (1959); Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 51
Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958); Horwith v. City of Fresno, 74 Cal. App. 2d 443, 168
(1946).
P.2d 3767
8
In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 389
P.2d 538 (1964), stated in general terms that the levy and collection of taxes by a
chartered city is a mumcipal affair. The question considered in the case, however,

involved the validity of certain tax allocation provisions of a city ordinance. The court
decided this question on the basis of CAL. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 19, which has removed
various tax allocation problems from the municipal affairs field. Since the court was not
really concerned with the specific question of whether the levy of a revenue tax is a
mumcipal affair, it would appear that the possible inpact of the income tax statute is yet
to be felt.
39
Sims v. Ahems, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W 720 (1925); California Employment
Comm'n v. Black-Foxe Military Institute, 43 Cal. App. 2d 868, 110 P.2d 729 (1941).
40 It has been pointed out that this is the prevailing definition of municipal affairs.
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tax levied on local business and its activities. Following this reasoning, it would
seem that if city income taxes are not municipal affairs, then neither are other
forms of city revenue taxation.
The courts, however, do not have to accept the proposition that if city income
taxation is not a muicipal affair then neither are other forms of city revenue taxation. The reasoning that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between income taxation and other forms of revenue taxation overlooks the fact that the
State may justifiably have a larger interest in personal income taxation than in
other forms of taxation. Since income taxation is a major source of state revenue,
a prohibition of city income taxation may serve to protect this source for the
State. Income taxation can also be a larger and more apparent burden on the
taxpayer than other forms of taxation and the State may wish to assure its citizens
that such taxation will be kept to a mmnmum. Thus, it would seem, realistically,
that the State would have a greater degree of concern with personal income taxation than with, say, a local garbage collection fee. For these reasons, it is clearly
possible for the courts to hold city income taxation to be a matter of general statewide concern and at the same time hold other forms of city revenue taxation to
be a municipal affair. But the question is, even though the courts may continue
to say that revenue taxation is a municipal affair, is this actually true? By analogy
to the situation with the income tax statute, it would seem that, if the legislature
wishes to preempt the field concerning another type of city revenue taxation, it
need only pass a statute to that effect. All the courts have to do is ratify the legislative determination that the particular revenue tax is of general statewide concern and therefore not a municipal affair, and the statute becomes completely
valid. 41 If this procedure be followed, is there any real basis for a continuance of
the holding that revenue taxation in general is a municipal affair? Can it truly
be said that the power of a chartered city to tax for revenue purposes is limited
only by the constitution and the local charter? It appears that, if the income tax
statute is valid, the purported municipal affairs nature of city revenue taxation
has been seriously undermined, even if the courts do distinguish between income
taxation and other forms of revenue taxation.
The above considerations have brought to the fore the fact that the two possible alternative conclusions as to the effect of the statute present a readily apparent dilemma. On the one hand, if the statute were to be held invalid, such a
holding would be in line with existing authority concerning the municipal affairs
nature of city revenue taxation, 42 but would thwart a clearly expressed legislative
City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804, 811, 306 P.2d 453, 456 (1957); Fragley
v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 58 Pac. 923 (1899).
41
It was held m Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d
276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963), that the legislative purpose in each instance
is the test of whether or not a given area of activity is a muicipal affair. If this test were
applied here, there would be no question as to the validity of the statute under consideration since its purpose is clear. This test, however, presents a fundamental anomaly- What
is the value to chartered cities of the existence of constitutional autonomy in the regulation of muicipal affairs if the legislature can take away this autonomy by the simple act
of defining the field of activity as not being a muicipal affair because it is a matter of
statewide concern?
42 City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 98, 308 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1957); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal. 2d 465, 469, 211 P.2d 564, 566 (1949).
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intent to preempt the field of income taxation. 43 On the other hand, if city income
taxation is held not to be a municipal affair, the statute would be valid and the
legislative intent enforced, but a serious doubt would be raised as to whether
city revenue taxation is truly a municipal affair. The desirability of this latter
alternative is left to the judgment of the reader, but it might be advisable to keep
in mmd the words of the United States Supreme Court that a "municipality without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable of acting and
serving no useful purpose."44
It is important to point out that there is a method by which city income taxation
can be effectively prohibited and at the same time leave the municipal affairs
quality of city revenue taxation intact, thus solving the dilemma. This method is
constitutional amendment. If a constitutional amendment prohibiting city personal income taxes were adopted, it would be unquestionably valid because municipal affairs are subject to restrictions appearing in the constitution.4 5 Such an
amendment would coincide, rather than conflict, with existing authority concern46
ing the municipal affairs nature of city revenue taxation for the same reason.
47
The constitution has been used in the past to regulate other areas of taxation;
why not use it for income taxes? It would seem that there is no apparent reason
for not using this method to regulate the field. Such an amendment would certainly be less troublesome than a statute that says it is effective, "notwithstanding
"48
any decisions to the contrary
Conclusion
The California Legislature's purported prohibition of all city personal income
taxation presents a dilemma, in view of its conflict with existing authority as to
the municipal affairs nature of city revenue taxation. Assuming the validity of the
statute, although the assumption is somewhat questionable, the statute seriously
undermines the chartered city's power to tax for revenue purposes. Powers of
taxation are extremely important to every municipality. If the State wishes to
prohibit city personal income taxation, it should do so by constitutional amendment. Such an amendment would provide effective prohibition and at the same
time preserve the municipal affairs nature of revenue taxation to the chartered
cities of the State.
Brown B. Smith*
43
CAL.Rsv.
44

& TAx. ConE § 17041.5.

United States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381, 393 (1878).
45 Ex parteBraun, 141 Cal. 204, 74 Pac. 780 (1903).
4
Itshould be noted, however, that this suggested solution, while solving this
revenue taxation dilemma, still leaves a wider problem raised by Professional Fire
Fighters:Would not the same dilemma anse if the legislature prohibited some other and
of municipal revenue taxation? In this regard see note 41 supra.
4
7 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 4/5(f) expressly regulates certain types of insurance
taxation by providing that the tax inposed by this section is "in lieu of all other taxes
and licenses, state, county, and municipal
" By sunilar provisions the constitution
regulates the fields of taxation of banks (CAL. CoNsT. art. XHI, § 16(1) (a)) and certain
allocations of muicipal taxes (CAL. CONST. art. XIHI, § 19).
48 CAL.REv. & TAx. CoDE § 17041.5.

*Member, Second Year Class.

